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Abstract
We consider the well known, and notoriously difficult, problem of
a single revenue-maximizing seller selling two or more heterogeneous
goods to a single buyer whose private values for the goods are drawn
from a (possibly correlated) known distribution, and whose valuation
is additive over the goods. We show that when there are two (or more)
goods, simple mechanisms—such as selling the goods separately or as
a bundle—may yield only a negligible fraction of the optimal revenue.
This resolves the open problem of Briest, Chawla, Kleinberg, and
Weinberg (JET 2015) who prove the result for at least three goods in
the related setup of a unit-demand buyer. We also introduce the menu
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size as a simple measure of the complexity of mechanisms, and show
that the revenue may increase polynomially with menu size and that
no bounded menu size can ensure any positive fraction of the optimal
revenue. The menu size also turns out to “pin down” the revenue
properties of deterministic mechanisms.
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1 Introduction
Are complex auctions better than simple ones? Myerson’s (1981) classic
result (see also Riley and Samuelson 1981 and Riley and Zeckhauser 1983)
shows that if one is aiming to maximize revenue when selling a single good,
then the answer is “no.” The optimal auction is very simple, allocating the
good to the highest bidder (using either first or second price) as long as he
bids above a single deterministically chosen reserve price.
However, when selling multiple goods the situation turns out to be much
more complex. There has been significant work both in economics and in
computer science1 showing that, for selling multiple goods, simple auctions
are no longer optimal. Specifically, it is known that randomized auctions may
yield more revenue than deterministic ones, and that bundling the goods may
yield higher (or lower) revenue than selling each of the goods separately. This
is true even in the very simple setting where there is a single buyer.
In this paper we consider such a simple setting: a single seller, who aims
to maximize his expected revenue, sells two or more heterogeneous goods
to a single buyer whose private values for the goods are drawn from an
arbitrary (possibly correlated) but known prior distribution, and whose value
for bundles is additive over the goods in the bundle. Since we are considering
only a single seller, this work may alternatively be interpreted as dealing with
the monopolistic pricing of multiple goods.2
In our previous paper, Hart and Nisan (2017, originally circulated in
2012), we considered the setup where the buyer’s values for the different
1See Section 2 for a literature survey.
2See Appendix A.4 for the extension of our results from the single-buyer to the multiple-
buyer setting.
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goods are independent, in which case we showed that simple mechanisms are
approximately optimal: selling each good separately (deterministically) for
its optimal price extracts a constant fraction of the optimal revenue. In this
paper we show that the picture changes completely when the valuations of
the goods are correlated, in which case “complex” mechanisms can become
arbitrarily better than “simple” ones.
The setup is that of k goods, whose valuation to the single buyer is given
by a random variable X = (X1, X2, ..., Xk) with values in R
k
+; we emphasize
that we allow for arbitrary dependence between the coordinates of X. The
buyer’s valuation for a bundle of goods is additive over the goods; thus, for
example, getting the first two goods is worth X1+X2 to the buyer.We denote
by Rev(X) the optimal revenue achievable by any mechanism for selling k
goods to an additive buyer with a random valuation X.
Consider first the case of just two goods, i.e., k = 2. When the valuations
of the two goods are independent (i.e., X1 and X2 are independent random
variables), Hart and Nisan (2017) showed that selling the goods separately—
each one at its optimal one-good price—is guaranteed to yield at least 50%
of the optimal revenue, a bound that was later improved to 62% by Hart and
Reny (2017). This can be stated in terms of the “Guaranteed Fraction of
Optimal Revenue” (GFOR)3 as
GFOR(separate; 2 independent goods) ≥
√
e√
e+ 1
≈ 0.62.
How does this fraction change when the two goods need not be indepen-
dent? Our first result is that it drops all the way down to zero:
GFOR(separate; 2 goods) = 0.
Indeed, we show that4
3See Hart and Nisan (2017): given a class of mechanisms N and a class of valuations
X, we define GFOR(N ;X) as the maximal fraction of the optimal revenue that can be
achieved by mechanisms in N for any valuation in X (cf. Section 3.4).
4A stronger result is in fact proved; see Section 4 for precise statements of the main
results.
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For every ε > 0 there exists a two-good random valua-
tion X with values in [0, 1]2 such that
SRev(X) < ε ·Rev(X),
where SRev stands for the “separate revenue” achievable by selling the goods
separately. Thus, for correlated goods, selling separately may yield only an
arbitrarily small fraction of the optimal revenue. We emphasize that, while
we provide specific such random valuations X, none of the constructions in
this paper are knife-edge or pathological (see Remark 6.2).
This suggests considering the other one-dimensional mechanism, namely,
that of selling the two goods as a bundle. That does not help: the guaranteed
fraction of optimal revenue is still zero; i.e.,
GFOR(bundled; 2 goods) = 0.
In fact, even the larger class of all “deterministic” mechanisms—in which
the seller sets a price for each good separately as well as a price for the
bundle—does not fare any better:
GFOR(deterministic; 2 goods) = 0. (1)
This immediately extends to any number of goods k ≥ 2 (just add k − 2
goods with zero valuation):
GFOR(deterministic; k ≥ 2 goods) = 0. (2)
While these results are new in the case of k = 2 goods, they have already
been established for k ≥ 3 goods in the related model of a unit-demand (in-
stead of additive) buyer—i.e., a buyer who wants to get only one of the k
goods—by Briest, Chawla, Kleinberg, and Weinberg (2015, originally circu-
lated in 2010); the case of two goods was left open, with some partial results
indicating that GFOR may be bounded away from zero for k = 2. While
the unit-demand model and our additive model are different, they are closely
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related: the various revenues in the two models are within constant factors of
one another (see Appendix A.3 for precise statements). On the one hand, this
implies that our result (2) for k ≥ 3 goods follows from the above-mentioned
result of Briest et al. (2015); on the other hand, our result (1) solves their
open problem for k = 2: there is an infinite gap between the deterministic
revenue and the optimal revenue in the unit-demand model, already for two
goods.
What these results say is that allowing for probabilistic outcomes, where
the buyer gets some goods with probabilities that are strictly between 0
and 1, makes a huge difference in terms of revenue. But is it really the
probabilistic vs. deterministic distinction that matters here? A deterministic
mechanism for k goods consists of setting prices for nonempty subsets of
goods and thus provides to the buyer at most 2k − 1 nonzero outcomes to
choose from. Suppose we were to limit the seller to provide the same number,
i.e., 2k− 1, of outcomes, but allow these outcomes to be probabilistic; would
that significantly increase the revenue? The answer is that it would not! As
we will see, the guaranteed fraction of optimal revenue remains zero for any
fixed bound on the number of outcomes.
Formally, we define the menu size of a mechanism to be the number of
possible outcomes of the mechanism, where an outcome (or “menu entry”)
specifies for each good i the probability qi that it is allocated to the buyer,
together with the payment s that the buyer pays to the seller;5 it turns out
to be convenient not to count the “zero” outcome of getting nothing and
paying nothing (this outcome is always available, as it corresponds to the
individual rationality or participation constraint). It is easy to see, and well
known, that in our setting any mechanism can be put into the normal form of
offering a fixed menu and letting the buyer choose among these menu entries.
Notice that while deterministic mechanisms for k goods can have a menu size
of at most 2k−1 (since each qi must be 0 or 1), randomized mechanisms can
have an arbitrarily large, even infinite, menu size. Let Rev[m](X) denote
the optimal revenue achievable by mechanisms whose menu size is at most
5See Dobzinski (2011) for an earlier use of menu size in the context of combinatorial
auctions.
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m. For a single good, k = 1, the characterization of optimal mechanisms of
Myerson (1981) implies that Rev[1](X) is already the same as the optimal
Rev(X), but this is no longer true for more than a single good: the revenue
may strictly increase as we allow the menu size to increase.
Our general result is that for any fixed m, mechanisms that have at most
mmenu entries cannot guarantee any positive fraction of the optimal revenue:
GFOR(menu size ≤ m; k goods) = 0 (3)
for any number of goods k ≥ 2 and any menu size m ≥ 1. Thus, having a
large set of possible outcomes—a large menu from which the buyer chooses,
according to his valuation (or type)—seems to be the crucial attribute of the
high-revenue mechanisms: it enables the sophisticated screening between
different buyer types that is required for high-revenue extraction. As stated
above, taking m = 2k − 1 yields result (2), which suggests that (2) is not
driven by the mechanisms being deterministic, but rather by their being
limited in the number of outcomes that they can offer.
Result (3) says that it does not matter exactly how “simple” mechanisms
are defined; as long as their menu size is bounded (which is natural, as
unbounded menu size can hardly be considered simple6), we have
For multiple goods, simple mechanisms cannot guaran-
tee any positive fraction of the optimal revenue.
The fact that all simple mechanisms look equally “bad” when compared to
the optimal revenue-maximizing mechanism does not however preclude some
mechanisms from being better than others in terms of their revenues. This
leads us to compare mechanisms by taking as a benchmark the simplest basic
revenue (rather than the optimal revenue), which we take to be Rev[1](X),
the revenue that is achievable from a single take-it-or-leave it offer (i.e., a
single menu entry); as we will see in Section 3.3, this basic revenue turns out
to be nothing other than the revenue from selling the bundle of all goods at
6See the discussion in Section 3.2 on other complexity measures that do not use the
“normal form” menu representation.
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its optimal price, which we denote by BRev(X).7 Thus, given a mechanism
µ we define the “Multiple of Basic revenue” of µ, or MoB(µ) for short, to
be the maximum, over all (relevant) valuations X, of the ratio of the revenue
that µ extracts fromX to the basic revenue Rev[1](X) fromX (the definition
is then extended to classes of mechanisms by taking the maximum over the
mechanisms in the class). Thus MoB(µ) measures how many times better
the revenue from µ can be relative to the basic revenue.
The MoB measure turns out to be a useful tool for the analysis: first,
it is given by a simple explicit formula (see Theorem 5.1); second, finding a
sequence of mechanisms whose MoB goes to infinity is equivalent to proving
that GFOR(bounded) = 0 (see Lemma 3.4(i)); and third, for any class
N of mechanisms with a bounded MoB—such as deterministic mechanisms,
or mechanisms with bounded menu size—the result that GFOR(N ) = 0
follows immediately from GFOR(bounded) = 0 (see Lemma 3.4(ii)).
We also show that the relation betweenMoB and menu size is polynomial
(see Theorem C); that MoB of deterministic mechanisms is exponential in
the number of goods (specifically, for many goods, i.e., large k, MoB of
deterministic mechanisms is essentially the same as MoB of mechanisms
with the same menu size, i.e., 2k−1; see Theorem D); and, finally, that MoB
of separate-selling mechanisms is linear in the number of goods (specifically,
it equals the number of goods k; see Theorem E).
Our results thus show that the menu size, although it is just a simple
and crude measure of the complexity of mechanisms, is nevertheless strongly
related to revenue-extraction capabilities.
1.1 Organization of the Paper
In Section 2 immediately below we briefly go over some of the related litera-
ture. Section 3 presents our model, defines the menu-size complexity measure
and the revenue comparison tools GFOR and MoB, and provides some pre-
liminary results. The main results are then stated in Section 4. Section 5
deals with the MoB measure, which is then used in Sections 6 and 7 to
7The “B” in BRev may thus stand also for “Basic.”
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construct valuations that prove our results; see Section 4.3 for a detailed
guide to the proofs. Section 8 studies separate selling, and introduces a more
refined “additive menu size” complexity measure. We conclude in Section
9 with positive approximation results for the case where the valuations are
in a bounded domain. Additional results are relegated to the appendices:
the computation of MoB for two-good deterministic mechanisms (Appendix
A.1); the use of the separate-selling revenue, instead of the bundled revenue,
as the “basic” revenue (Appendix A.2); the relations between our setup and
the unit-demand setup (Appendix A.3); and the multiple-buyer case (Ap-
pendix A.4).
2 Literature
We briefly survey some of the existing work on these issues.
The realization that maximizing revenue with multiple goods is a complex
problem has had a long history in economic theory and more recently in the
computer science literature as well. McAfee and McMillan (1988) identify
cases where the optimal mechanism is deterministic. However, Thanassoulis
(2004) and Manelli and Vincent (2006) found a technical error in the pa-
per and presented counterexamples.8 These papers contain good surveys of
the related work within economic theory, with more recent studies by Fang
and Norman (2006), Pycia (2006), Manelli and Vincent (2007, 2012), Jehiel,
Meyer-ter-Vehn, and Moldovanu (2007), Lev (2011), Pavlov (2011), Hart and
Reny (2015). In the past few years algorithmic work on these types of topics
has been carried out. One line of work shows that for discrete distribu-
tions the optimal mechanism can be found by linear programming in rather
general settings: Briest, Chawla, Kleinberg, and Weinberg (2010/2015),9
Cai, Daskalakis, and Weinberg (2012a), Alaei, Fu, Haghpanah, Hartline,
and Malekian (2012). Another line of work deals with optimal mecha-
8See Hart and Reny (2015) for a simple and transparent such example, together with
a discussion of why this phenomenon can occur only when there is more than one good.
9By “2010/2015” we mean “conference publication in 2010 and journal publication in
2015.”
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nisms for multiple goods in various settings: Daskalakis, Deckelbaum, and
Tzamos (2013, 2017), Giannakopoulos (2014), Giannakopoulos and Koutsou-
pias (2014), Menicucci, Hurkens, and Jeon (2015), Tang and Wang (2017).
Yet another line of work attempts to approximate the optimal revenue by
simple mechanisms in various settings, where simplicity is defined qualita-
tively: Chawla, Hartline, and Kleinberg (2007), Chawla, Hartline, Malec,
and Sivan (2010), Chawla, Malec, and Sivan (2010), Alaei, Fu, Haghpanah,
Hartline, and Malekian (2012), Cai, Daskalakis, and Weinberg (2012b). In
this line of research, Hart and Nisan (2012/2017) consider mechanisms that
sell the goods either separately or as a single bundle to be simple mechanisms,
and show that when the values of the goods are independently distributed
then a nontrivial fraction of the optimal revenue can be ensured by simple
mechanisms. This was followed by various improved approximation results
for independently distributed goods: Li and Yao (2013), Babaioff, Immorlica,
Lucier, and Weinberg (2014), Yao (2014), Rubinstein and Weinberg (2015),
Babaioff, Nisan, and Rubinstein (2018). By contrast, Briest, Chawla, Klein-
berg, and Weinberg (2010/2015) consider deterministic mechanisms to be
simple, and, in the unit-demand setting with at least 3 correlated goods,
prove that deterministic mechanisms cannot ensure any positive fraction of
the revenue of general mechanisms.
Approaches to quantifying the complexity of mechanisms are studied by
Balcan, Blum, Hartline, and Mansour (2008), Dughmi, Han, and Nisan
(2014), Morgenstern and Roughgarden (2015); we discuss these in Section
3.2. Since the circulation in 2013 of early versions of the present paper there
has been additional work on menu-size complexity; see Babaioff, Gonczarowski,
and Nisan (2017), Gonczarowski (2017), the tutorial of Goldner and Gonczarowski
(2018), and the references there.
When the valuations are bounded, the approximation of auctions and
mechanisms by various discretizations is studied by Hartline and Koltun
(2005), Balcan, Blum, Hartline, and Mansour (2008) (where the construction
is attributed to Nisan), Briest, Chawla, Kleinberg, andWeinberg (2010/2015),
Daskalakis and Weinberg (2012), Dughmi, Han, and Nisan (2014); see the
discussion following the statement of Theorem B in Section 4.
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3 Preliminaries
3.1 The Model
The basic model is standard, and the notation follows our previous paper
Hart and Nisan (2017), which the reader may consult for further details (see
also Hart and Reny 2015).
One seller (or “monopolist”) is selling a number k ≥ 1 of goods (or
“items,” “objects,” etc.) to one buyer.
The goods have no value or cost to the seller. Let x1, x2, ..., xk ≥ 0 be
the values of the goods to the buyer. The value of getting a set of goods
is additive: getting the subset I ⊆ {1, 2, ..., k} of goods is worth ∑i∈I xi
to the buyer (and so, in particular, the buyer’s demand is not restricted to
one good only). The valuation of the goods is given by a random variable
X = (X1, X2, ..., Xk) that takes values in R
k
+ (we thus assume that valuations
are always nonnegative); we will refer to X as a k-good random valuation.
The realization x = (x1, x2, ..., xk) ∈ Rk+ of X is known to the buyer, but not
to the seller, who knows only the distribution F of X (which may be viewed
as the seller’s belief); we refer to a buyer with valuation x also as a buyer of
type x. The buyer and the seller are assumed to be risk neutral and to have
quasi-linear utilities.
The objective is to maximize the seller’s (expected) revenue.
As was well established by the so-called “Revelation Principle” (starting
with Myerson 1981; see for instance the book of Krishna 2010), we can re-
strict ourselves to “direct mechanisms” and “truthful equilibria.” A direct
mechanism µ consists of a pair of functions10 (q, s), where q = (q1, q2, ..., qk) :
R
k
+ → [0, 1]k and s : Rk+ → R, which prescribe the allocation of goods and
the payment, respectively. Specifically, if the buyer reports a valuation vector
x ∈ Rk+, then qi(x) ∈ [0, 1] is the probability that the buyer receives good11 i
(for i = 1, 2, ..., k), and s(x) is the payment that the seller receives from the
10All functions in this paper are assumed to be Borel-measurable (cf. Hart and Reny
2015, footnotes 10 and 48).
11When the goods are infinitely divisible and the valuations are linear in quantities, qi
may be alternatively viewed as the quantity of good i that the buyer gets.
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buyer; we refer to (q(x), s(x)) as an outcome. When the buyer reports his
value x truthfully, his payoff is12 b(x) =
∑k
i=1 qi(x)xi−s(x) = q(x) ·x−s(x),
and the seller’s payoff is s(x).
The mechanism µ = (q, s) satisfies individual rationality (IR) if b(x) ≥ 0
for every x ∈ Rk+; it satisfies incentive compatibility (IC) if b(x) ≥ q(x˜) · x−
s(x˜) for every alternative report x˜ ∈ Rk+ of the buyer when his value is x, for
every x ∈ Rk+.
The (expected) revenue of a mechanism µ = (q, s) from a buyer with
random valuation X, which we denote by R(µ;X), is the expectation of the
payment received by the seller; i.e., R(µ;X) = E [s(X)] . We now define
• Rev(X), the optimal revenue, is the maximal revenue that can be
obtained: Rev(X) = supµR(µ;X), where the supremum is taken over
all IC and IR mechanisms µ.
As seen in Hart and Nisan (2017), when maximizing revenue we can limit
ourselves without loss of generality to IR and IC mechanisms that satisfy in
addition the no positive transfer (NPT) property: s(x) ≥ 0 for every x ∈ Rk+
(and so s(0, 0, ..., 0) = b(0, 0, ..., 0) = 0).
From now on we will assume that all mechanisms µ are given in
direct form, i.e., µ = (q, s), and that they satisfy IR, IC, and NPT.
When there is only one good, i.e., when k = 1, Myerson’s (1981) result is
that
Rev(X) = sup
p≥0
p · P [X ≥ p] = sup
p≥0
p · P [X > p] = sup
p≥0
p · (1− F (p)), (4)
where F is the cumulative distribution function ofX. Thus, there are optimal
mechanisms where the seller “posts” a price p and the buyer buys the good
for the price p whenever his value is at least p; in other words, the seller
makes the buyer a “take-it-or-leave-it” offer to buy the good at price p.
Besides the maximal revenue Rev(X), we are also interested in what can
be obtained from certain classes of mechanisms.
12The scalar product of two n-dimensional vectors y = (y1, ..., yn) and z = (z1, ..., zn) is
y · z =∑n
i=1
yizi.
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• SRev(X), the separate revenue, is the maximal revenue that can be
obtained by selling each good separately. Thus
SRev(X) = Rev(X1) +Rev(X2) + ... +Rev(Xk).
• BRev(X), the bundling revenue, is the maximal revenue that can be
obtained by selling all the goods together in one “bundle.” Thus
BRev(X) = Rev(X1 +X2 + ...+Xk).
• DRev(X), the deterministic revenue, is the maximal revenue that can
be obtained by deterministic mechanisms; these are the mechanisms in
which every good i = 1, 2, ..., k is either fully allocated or not at all:
qi(x) ∈ {0, 1} for all valuations x ∈ Rk+ (rather than qi(x) ∈ [0, 1]).
While the separate and bundling revenues are obtained by solving one-
dimensional problems (using (4)), for each good in the former, and for the
bundle in the latter, the deterministic revenue is a multidimensional problem.
3.2 Menu and Menu Size
Given a k-good mechanism µ = (q, s), we define its menu as the range of its
nonzero outcomes, i.e.,
menu(µ) := {(q(x), s(x)) : x ∈ Rk+}\{(0, 0, ..., 0), 0)} ⊂ [0, 1]k × R+
(we ignore the zero outcome, ((0, 0, ..., 0), 0),which is always included without
loss of generality as it corresponds to the IR constraint13). We will refer to
each outcome in the menu as a menu entry. Conversely, any set of outcomes
M ⊂ [0, 1]k × R+ generates a mechanism µ = (q, s) with (q(x), s(x)) ∈
argmax(g,t)(g · x − t) where (g, t) ranges over M ∪ {((0, 0, ..., 0), 0)}, whose
13We thus slightly depart from Hart and Reny (2015) (where the menu includes the zero
outcome as well); this yields simple relations (such as Proposition 3.1) between menu size
and revenue.
13
menu is included in14 M (the mechanism is well defined up to tie-breaking;
see Hart and Reny 2015 for more details).
The menu size of a mechanism µ is defined as the cardinality of its menu,
i.e., the number of elements of menu(µ), which may well be infinite:
menu size(µ) := |menu(µ)|.
Since a menu cannot contain two entries (g, t) and (g, t′) with the same
allocation g ∈ [0, 1]k but with different payments t and t′ (if, say, t′ > t
then (g, t′) will never be chosen, as (g, t) is strictly preferred to it by every
buyer type), the menu size is identical to the cardinality of the set of nonzero
allocations; i.e.,
menu size(µ) = |{q(x) : x ∈ Rk+ and q(x) 6= (0, 0, ..., 0)}|.
The corresponding revenue is:
• Rev[m](X), the “menu-size-m” revenue, is the maximal revenue that
can be obtained by mechanisms whose menu size is at most m.
We will refer to the menu-size-1 revenue Rev[1] as the basic revenue: it
is the revenue achievable from a single take-it-or-leave-it offer.
Interestingly, Babaioff, Gonczarowski, and Nisan (2017) have recently
shown that the communication complexity of a mechanism is precisely the
base 2 logarithm of its menu size.
Menu size is clearly a very crude measure of the complexity of a mech-
anism. In particular, it is based on the “normal” form of the mechanism
(namely, a menu), and so it ignores the fact that a large menu may well be
representable in a very succinct manner. Such an approach, namely, a Kol-
mogorov complexity notion, is used by Dughmi, Han and Nisan (2014). The
additive menu size, a refinement of menu size that we introduce in Section
8, is also a step in this direction. Another approach is based on learning-like
notions of “dimension”: see Balcan, Blum, Hartline, and Mansour (2008) and
14As some outcomes in M may never be chosen; it will be convenient at times to ignore
this and refer to such a µ as a mechanism with menu M .
14
Morgenstern and Roughgarden (2015). The advantage of our menu-size mea-
sure is that it is simple, it is defined for each mechanism separately (rather
than for classes of mechanisms), and, as we will see below,15 it provides useful
connections to revenue-extraction capabilities.
3.3 Basic Results on Menu Size
We provide here a few simple and immediate relations concerning menu-size
complexity and revenue.
Proposition 3.1 For every k ≥ 2 and every k-good random valuation X we
have
(i)
Rev[1](X) = BRev(X); (5)
(ii) for any integers m1, m2 ≥ 1
Rev[m1+m2](X) ≤ Rev[m1](X) +Rev[m2](X);
(iii) the sequence 1
m
Rev[m](X) is weakly decreasing in m, and thus, in
particular, for every integer m ≥ 1
Rev[m](X) ≤ m ·Rev[1](X); (6)
(iv)
DRev(X) ≤ (2k − 1) ·Rev[1](X) = (2k − 1) ·BRev(X).
Proof. (i) Let µ be any mechanism with a single menu entry, say (g, t). If
the seller offers instead to sell the whole bundle at the same price t, the buyer
will surely buy whenever he did so in µ, and the revenue can only increase.
Thus R(µ;X) ≤BRev(X). Conversely, BRev(X) is achieved by a single
menu entry by Myerson’s result (4).
15See the tutorial of Goldner and Gonczarowski (2018) and the references there for
additional such results.
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(ii) Let µ = (q, s) be any mechanism with menu (gn, tn)
m1+m2
n=1 . For each
menu entry (gn, tn) let πn be the probability that it is chosen (when the
valuation is X), then the revenue from µ is
∑m1+m2
n=1 πntn. Let µ1 and µ2
be mechanisms with menus (gn, tn)
m1
n=1 and (gn, tn)
m1+m2
n=m1+1, respectively. The
probability that (gn, tn) for n ≤ m1 is chosen is at least as large in µ1 as it is
in µ (since every valuation x ∈ Rk+ that prefers this menu item in µ continues
to prefer it in µ1, and all tn are ≥ 0 by NPT), which implies that the revenue
from µ1 is at least
∑m1
n=1 πntn. A similar argument shows that the revenue
from µ2 is at least
∑m1+m2
n=m1+1
πntn.
(iii) Let µ = (q, s) be any mechanism with menu (gn, tn)
m
n=1; for each
menu entry (gn, tn) let πn be the probability that it is chosen. Without loss
of generality order the menu entries so that the sequence πntn is weakly
decreasing. Let m′ < m; the mechanism µ′ with menu (gn, tn)
m′
n=1 yields
as revenue at least
∑m′
n=1 πntn, which is at least (m
′/m)
∑m
n=1 πntn (because
πntn is weakly decreasing). Thus R(µ
′;X) ≥ (m′/m)R(µ;X).
(iv) A deterministic mechanism has menu size at most 2k − 1.
For small menu size m the inequalites in (ii) and (iii) are tight, as the
example below shows that Rev[m](X) = m·Rev[1](X) for m not exceeding
the number of goods k. They remain essentially tight for m up to 2k − 1
(by Theorem D below); as for large m, we will see that Rev[m](X) can be as
large as16 Ω(m1/7)·Rev[1](X) (see Theorem C).
Example 3.2 Let 1 ≤ m ≤ k. Take a large17 H > 0, and consider the
following random valuation X. For each i = 1, ..., m, with a probability αi
that is proportional to 1/H i−1, good i is valued at H i−1 and all the other
goods are valued at 0; thus αi = c/H
i−1, where c := 1/(1 + 1/H + ... +
1/Hm−1). Bundling yields a revenue of 1 (because setting the bundle price
at H i−1 yields a revenue of c(1/H i−1 + ... + 1/Hm−1), which is maximal at
i = 1, and the revenue there is 1). Selling each good i = 1, ..., m at price H i−1
16It is convenient to use the standard O and Ω notations. For two expressions F and G
that depend on certain variables, we write F = O(G) if supF/G < ∞, and F = Ω(G) if
inf F/G > 0; i.e., there is a constant 0 < c < ∞ such that F ≤ cG, respectively F ≥ cG,
for any values of the variables in the relevant range.
17Theorem 5.1 below provides the tool to easily generate such examples.
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yields a revenue of c from each good; this is obtained at distinct valuations,
and so the mechanism consisting of these m menu entries yields a revenue of
mc, which is close to m for large H.
3.4 Revenue Comparisons: GFOR and MoB
To evaluate how good mechanisms are we compare the revenue that they
can extract to two benchmarks, a “high” one and a “low” one. The high
benchmark is the optimal revenue Rev, and the low benchmark is the basic
revenue Rev[1] =BRev.
18 As discussed in the Introduction, when the valua-
tions of the goods are correlated the former yields infinite gaps in most cases
of interest, and so the latter is needed to provide useful comparisons.
Formally, let X be a class of random valuations (e.g., k goods, two inde-
pendent goods, and so on), and let N be a class of mechanisms (e.g., separate
mechanisms, deterministic mechanisms, and so on).
We define
• GFOR(N ;X), the Guaranteed Fraction of Optimal Revenue (Hart and
Nisan 2017), as the maximal fraction α such that, for any random
valuation X in X, mechanisms in the class N yield a revenue that is at
least the fraction α of the optimal revenue; that is,19
GFOR(N ;X) := inf
X∈X
N -Rev(X)
Rev(X)
,
where N -Rev(X) := supµ∈N R(µ;X) denotes the maximal revenue
that can be obtained by any mechanism in the class20 N .
18See Appendix A.2 for a similar, but slightly less sharp, approach where the basic
revenue is taken to be the separate-selling revenue SRev.
19When taking the infimum we ignore the cases 0/0 and ∞/∞ (because the inequality
N -Rev(X) ≥ α Rev(X) holds for any α in these cases). The same applies when taking
the supremum and, more generally, when dealing with any ratio of revenues throughout
the paper.
20GFOR is the reciprocal of the so-called “competitive ratio” used in the computer
science literature. While the two notions are clearly equivalent, using the optimal revenue
as the benchmark (i.e., 100%) and measuring everything relative to this basis—as GFOR
does—seems to come more naturally. See the remarks in Section 2.2 of Hart and Nisan
(2017), which, in particular, explain why ratios are used.
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• MoB(N ;X), the Multiple of Basic revenue, as the minimal multiple β
such that, for any random valuation X in X, mechanisms in the class
N achieve a revenue that is at most the multiple β of the basic revenue;
that is,
MoB(N ;X) := sup
X∈X
N -Rev(X)
Rev[1](X)
= sup
X∈X
N -Rev(X)
BRev(X)
;
when N consists of a single k-good mechanism µ and X is the class of
all k-good random valuations we write MoB(µ) for short.
Thus, MoB(N ;X) is the highest multiple of the basic revenue that may be
achieved by the mechanisms in N for valuations in X.
Putting α =GFOR(N ;X) and β =MoB(N ;X), we then have
α ·Rev(X) ≤ N -Rev(X) ≤ β ·Rev[1](X)
for every random valuation X in X, and both bounds are tight: i.e., for every
α′ > α there is X in X with α′·Rev(X) > N -Rev(X), and for every β′ < β
there is X in X with N -Rev(X) > β′·Rev[1](X).
Remark 3.3 The results of Proposition 3.1(iii)–(iv) can be thus restated as
MoB(menu size ≤ m; k goods) ≤ m and
MoB(deterministic; k goods) ≤ 2k − 1.
The following lemma provides simple but useful connections between
GFOR and MoB.
Lemma 3.4 LetM be the class of all (IC and IR) mechanisms, let N ⊂M,
and let X be a class of valuations. Then:
(i)
GFOR(bundled;X) =
1
MoB(M;X); and
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(ii)
GFOR(N ;X) ≤ MoB(N ;X) ·GFOR(bundled;X)
=
MoB(N ;X)
MoB(M;X) .
Proof. (i) GFOR(bundled) = infXBRev(X)/Rev(X) and MoB(M) =
supXRev(X)/BRev(X).
(ii) N -Rev/Rev= (N -Rev/BRev) · (BRev/Rev).
Thus, showing that there are mechanisms µ with arbitrarily large MoB
proves that GFOR(bundled) = 0 (by (i)), which then implies that
GFOR(menu size ≤ m) = 0 for any fixed m, and, in particular,
GFOR(deterministic) = 0 (by (ii) and Remark 3.3 above).
4 Main Results
We now state formally the main results, first for the Guaranteed Fraction
of Optimal Revenue (GFOR), and then for the Multiple of Basic revenue
(MoB), followed by an outline of the way in which these results are proved.
4.1 Results for GFOR
The results here are, first, that GFOR equals 0 for simple mechanisms,
including those with bounded menu size, and, second, that in the case of
bounded valuations GFOR becomes close to 1 for an appropriately large
enough menu size.
Theorem A For k ≥ 2 goods:
(i)
GFOR(bundled; k goods) = 0;
GFOR(separate; k goods) = 0;
GFOR(deterministic; k goods) = 0;
GFOR(menu size ≤ m; k goods) = 0
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for every finite menu size m ≥ 1.
(ii) For every ε > 0 there exists a k-good random valuation X with values
in [0, 1]k such that
DRev(X) < ε ·Rev(X).
(iii) There exists a k-good random valuation X such that
DRev(X) = 1 and Rev(X) =∞.
As discussed in the Introduction, our contribution lies in the result for
the case of k = 2 goods, as for k ≥ 3 it follows from Briest et al. (2014). In
part (i), once we have the result that GFOR for bundled is 0 all the other
results immediately follow, because Rev[m] ≤ m·BRev (by Proposition 3.1
and Lemma 3.4(ii) above). Clearly, (ii) and (iii) each yield (i). If we allow
the valuations to be unbounded then we can get the fraction ε in (ii) to go
all the way down to 0, which is (iii). Clearly (iii) implies (ii) (just truncate
X beyond a high enough value); the construction that yields (ii) however is
simpler and explicit. Part (ii) (and thus (i)) is proved in Section 6 and part
(iii) in Section 7.21
Looking at the constructions used in the proof of Theorem A, one sees
that the range of valuations (i.e., the support of X) is exponential in the gap
obtained; more precisely, if we restrict the values of each good to being in a
range that is bounded (from above as well as from below, i.e., away from22
0), say, in the range [L,H ], then the gap becomes bounded by some constant
power of log(H/L); see Section 9, where we show that this exponential blowup
in the range is indeed needed. Our result is:
Theorem B Let k = 2. There exists a constant c < ∞ such that for every
21Given the marginal distributions of the valuations of the two goods—which deter-
mine the separate revenue—we obtain joint distributions for which the revenue becomes
arbitrarily large; by contrast, Carroll (2017) looks at the smallest joint revenue for given
marginals.
22Both bounds are needed, as rescaling X rescales all revenues and so does not affect
the ratios between revenues.
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0 < L < H <∞ and ε > 0,
GFOR(menu size ≤ m; 2 goods with values in [L,H ]2) ≥ 1− ε
holds for every menu size m that satisfies
m ≥ c
ε5
log2
(
H
L
1
ε
)
.
This theorem is proved in Section 9. Again, contrast this result with the
unbounded range case: when the upper bound H is infinite (and L > 0) there
is a valuation X with Rev(X) =∞ while Rev[m](X) ≤ m for every finite m
(by23 Theorem A(iii) and (6)), and when the lower bound L is zero (and H is
finite) for every finite m there is a valuation X with Rev[m](X)/Rev(X) <
mε (by Theorem A(ii) and (6)).
Thus arbitrarily good approximations of the optimal revenue can be ob-
tained, for two goods, by a menu size m that is only polylogarithmic in
the range size H/L. This improves results obtainable by known techniques
(Hartline and Koluim 2005, Balcan et al. 2008, Briest et al. 2015, and our
Proposition 9.2 below), which yield a polynomial dependence on H/L (i.e.,
m ≥ (H/Lε)ck). Recently Dughmi, Han, and Nisan (2014) have extended the
polylogarithmic result to all k (i.e., m ≥ (log(H/(Lε))/ε)ck), and shown that
the exponential dependence on k is necessary.
4.2 Results for MoB
The results here show the relations between MoB and menu size (polyno-
mial), and, for deterministic and separate-selling mechanisms, between MoB
and the number of goods (exponential for the former and linear for the latter).
Theorem C There exists a constant c > 0 such that for every k ≥ 2 and
m ≥ 1
cm1/7 ≤MoB(menu size ≤ m; k goods) ≤ m.
23For the boundedness away from 0, see Remark 7.2.
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As discussed above, the right-hand side inequality, whose simple proof is
in Proposition 3.1, says that the revenue may grow at most linearly in the
menu size; as for the left-hand side, which is obtained from our construction
in the proof of Theorem A(iii) in Section 7, it says that the revenue may
grow at least polynomially in menu size.24
Returning to deterministic mechanisms, whose menu size is at most 2k−1,
we have the following.
Theorem D For every25 k ≥ 2:
2k − 1
k
≤ MoB(deterministic; k goods) (7)
≤ MoB(menu size ≤ 2k − 1; k goods) ≤ 2k − 1. (8)
The upper bound (8) is given, again, by Proposition 3.1; as for the lower
bound (7), which is proved using the techniques of the proof of Theorem
A(iii) in Section 7, it shows that the exponential-in-k bound is essentially
tight (the factor k being much smaller than 2k − 1 for large k). Note again
the contrast to the independent case, for which the bound is linear, rather
than exponential,26 in k: Lemma 28 in Hart and Nisan (2017) implies that
for k independent goods DRev(X) ≤ Rev(X) ≤ ck·Rev[1](X) for some
c > 0, and thus MoB(deterministic; k independent goods) ≤ ck.
The two inequalities in Theorem D say that the revenue that can be
extracted by deterministic mechanisms is, for large k, of the same order of
magnitude as for arbitrary mechanisms with a menu of size 2k − 1. This
suggests that the reason that deterministic mechanisms yield low revenue
24The increase is at a polynomial rate in m, and we do not think that the constant of 1/7
we obtain is tight. For larger values of k the construction in Briest et al. (2015) implies a
somewhat better polynomial dependence on m. For m that is at most exponential in k,
Theorem D below shows that the growth can be almost linear in m.
25We obtain in fact a lower bound that is somewhat better than (2k − 1)/k; for large k,
it is close to twice as much. See Proposition 7.3 and Remark 7.4.
26Proposition A.10 in Appendix A.2 below shows that the same exponential-in-k gap
exists between deterministic mechanisms and separate selling: there is X such that
DRev(X) ≥ (2k − 1)/k·SRev(X). This provides a rare doubly exponential contrast with
the independent case in which DRev(X) ≤ c log2 k·SRev(X) for some constant c (by
Theorem C in Hart and Nisan 2017).
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(cf. Theorem A) is not that they are deterministic, but rather that being
deterministic limits their menu size (to 2k − 1); any mechanism with that
menu size will do just as badly.
Finally, we consider the maximal revenue SRev obtainable by selling
each good separately (at its one-good optimal price). We have
Theorem E For every k ≥ 2:
MoB(separate; k goods) = k.
This theorem is proved in Section 8. Unlike in our previous results, the
bound here is the same as the one we have obtained for independently dis-
tributed goods, and it is tight already in that case; see Proposition 14(i) and
Example 27 in Hart and Nisan (2017).
Now the mechanism that sells the k goods separately has menu size 2k−1
(since the buyer may acquire any subset of the goods, and so there are 2k−1
possible outcomes), but its revenue may be at most k times, rather than 2k−1
times, the bundling revenue. Moreover, selling separately seems intuitively
to be much simpler than this exponential-in-k menu-size measure suggests:
one needs to determine only k prices. All this leads us to define a stronger
notion of mechanism complexity, one that assigns to separate selling its more
natural complexity, namely, k. This new measure allows “additive menus”
in which the buyer may choose not just single menu entries but also sets
of menu entries. We present this additive menu size complexity measure in
Section 8, and show that in fact our results hold with respect to this stronger
complexity measure as well.
4.3 Outline of the Proofs
We present now a short but hopefully useful outline of the proofs in the
following sections.
• In Section 5 we provide an explicit formula for MoB of a mecha-
nism, and construct random valuations where MoB is (almost) at-
tained (Theorem 5.1).
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• In Section 6 we construct mechanisms with an arbitrarily large MoB,
which shows that MOB(M) =∞ and so GFOR(bundled) = 0, thus
proving Theorem A(i) and (ii).
• In Section 7 we construct a random valuation, for Theoreom A(iii),
with an infinite gap between the revenue from simple mechanisms and
the optimal revenue; we also prove the lower bound of Theorem D for
deterministic mechanisms.
• In Section 8 we prove Theorem E for the separate revenue, and then
introduce and analyze the more refined “additive-menu-size” measure.
• In Section 9 we deal with valuations in bounded domains and prove
Theorem B.
5 The Multiple of Basic Revenue (MoB)
We start by providing a precise tool that measures how much better a mech-
anism can be relative to bundling. It will then be used in the next sections to
construct random valuations together with corresponding mechanisms that
yield revenues that are arbitrarily higher than the bundling revenue, and
thus than any other simple revenue as well. Recall that for a single k-good
mechanism µ we write MoB(µ) for short for MoB({µ}; k goods).
Theorem 5.1 Let µ = (q, s) be a k-good mechanism. Then
MoB(µ) =
∫ ∞
0
1
v(t)
dt,
where for every t > 0 we define27
v(t) := inf{||x||1 : x ∈ Rk+ and s(x) ≥ t}.
27The 1-norm ||x||1 =
∑
k
i=1
|xi| on Rk gives, for nonnegative x, the value
∑
k
i=1
xi of
the bundle of all goods to the buyer of type x. The infimum of an empty set is taken to
be ∞, and so v(t) =∞ when t is higher than any possible payment s(x).
24
Thus v(t) is the minimal value of the bundle, x1 + ... + xk, among all
the valuations x where the payment to the seller is at least t. Geometrically,
this says that the supporting hyperplane with normal (1, ..., 1) to the set
{x ∈ Rk+ : s(x) ≥ t} is x1+ ...+xk = v(t). The function v is weakly increasing
and satisfies v(t) ≥ t for every t > 0 (because∑i xi ≥ q(x)·x ≥ s(x) for every
x by IR); the function 1/v is nonnegative, weakly decreasing, and vanishes
beyond the maximal possible payment (i.e., for t > supx s(x)). Its integral
may well be zero or infinite, i.e., 0 ≤ MoB(µ) ≤ ∞ (with MoB(µ) = 0 only
when v(t) =∞ for every t > 0, which is the case only for the null mechanism
with s(x) = 0 for all x). When µ has a finite menu, say {(gn, tn)}mn=1, ordered
so that the sequence tn is weakly increasing, we have v(t) = v(tn) for every
tn−1 < t ≤ tn (some of these intervals may well be empty28), and so
MoB(µ) =
m∑
n=1
tn − tn−1
v(tn)
(9)
(computing the numbers v(tn) amounts to solving m linear programming
problems).
It may be instructive to compute MoB(µ) in a few examples with k = 2
goods.
Example 5.2 Let µ be given by the menu29 {x1 − p1, x2 − 2, x1 + x2 − 4},
and allow p1 to vary.
(i) When p1 = 1 we have (t1, t2, t3) = (1, 2, 4) and (v(t1), v(t2), v(t3)) =
(1, 2, 5) (attained, respectively, at the points (1, 0), (0, 2), and (2, 3); see
Figure 1). Therefore MoB(µ) = (1− 0)/1 + (2− 1)/2 + (4− 2)/5 = 19/10.
As we will see in the proof of Theorem 5.1 below, MoB(µ) is attained for
the random valuation X that takes the values (1, 0), (0, 2), and (2, 3) with
probabilities 1/v(1)− 1/v(2) = 1/2, 1/v(2) − 1/v(4) = 3/10, and 1/v(4) =
1/5, respectively; indeed, BRev(X) = max{(1 + 0) · 1, (0 + 2) · (1/2), (2 +
28If v(tn) = v(tn+1) then we may eliminate tn altogether from the sum, because
(tn − tn−1)/v(tn) + (tn+1 − tn)v(tn+1) = (tn+1 − tn−1)/v(tn+1).
29We write a menu entry (g, t) here as g · x − t; the payoff of the buyer with valuation
x is thus b(x) = max{0, x1 − p1, x2 − 2, x1 + x2 − 4}).
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1
2
3
0
0
x1
x2
x1 + x2 = 1
x1 + x2 = 2
x1 + x2 = 5
b(x) = 0
s(x) = 0
b(x) = x1 − 1
s(x) = 1
b(x) = x2 − 2
s(x) = 2
b(x) = x1 + x2 − 4
s(x) = 4
(1, 0)
(0, 2)
(2, 3)
Figure 1: The function v in Example 5.2(i): v(1) = ||(1, 0)||1 = 1, v(2) =
||(0, 2)||1 = 2, v(4) = ||(2, 3)||1 = 5
3) · (1/5)} = 1 and30 R(µ;X) = 1 · (1/2) + 2 · (3/10) + 4 · (1/5) = 19/10.
(ii) When p1 = 2 we have (t1, t2, t3) = (2, 2, 4) and (v(t1), v(t2), v(t3)) =
(2, 2, 4) (with v(2) attained at (2, 0) and also at (0, 2), and v(4) at (2, 2)).
Therefore MoB(µ) = (2− 0)/2 + (2− 2)/2 + (4− 2)/4 = 3/2.
(iii) When p1 = 5 we have (t1, t2, t3) = (2, 4, 5) and (v(t1), v(t2), v(t3)) =
(2, 4,∞) (with the first two attained at (0, 2) and (2, 2), and v(5) infinite
since x1 − 5 is never chosen by the buyer, as it is always strictly worse than
x1 + x2− 4). Therefore MoB(µ) = (2− 0)/2+ (4− 2)/4+ (5− 4)/∞ = 3/2.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. Put β :=
∫∞
0
1/v(t) dt.
30Assume without loss of generality that the buyer breaks ties in favor of the seller (i.e.,
the mechanism µ is “seller-favorable”); see Hart and Reny (2015).
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(i) First, we show that
R(µ;X)
BRev(X)
≤ β
for every k-good random valuation X. Indeed,
R(µ;X) = E [s(X)] =
∫ ∞
0
P [s(X) ≥ t] dt ≤
∫ ∞
0
P [||X||1 ≥ v(t)] dt
≤
∫ ∞
0
BRev(X)
v(t)
dt = β ·BRev(X),
where we have used: s(X) ≥ 0 by NPT; s(X) ≥ t implies ||X||1 ≥ v(t) by
the definition of v(t); and u · P [||X||1 ≥ u] ≤ BRev(X) for every u > 0.
(ii) Second, we show that for every β ′ < β (which, when β is infinite,
is taken to mean any arbitrarily large β ′), there exists a k-good random
valuation X with 0 <BRev(X) <∞ and
R(µ;X)
BRev(X)
> β′. (10)
Indeed, the function 1/v(t) is weakly decreasing and nonnegative, and its
integral is β, and so there exist 0 = t0 < t1 < ... < tN < tN+1 = ∞ with
0 = v(t0) < v(t1) < v(t2) < ... < v(tN) < v(tN+1) =∞ such that
β ′′ :=
N∑
n=1
tn − tn−1
v(tn)
> β ′.
Let ε > 0 be small enough so that β ′′ > (1 + ε)β ′ and v(tn+1) > (1 + ε)v(tn)
for all 1 ≤ n ≤ N. By the definition of v we can choose for every 1 ≤ n ≤ N
a point31 xn ∈ Rk+ such that s(xn) ≥ tn and v(tn) ≤ ||xn||1 < (1 + ε)v(tn);
then
N∑
n=1
tn − tn−1
||xn||1 >
N∑
n=1
tn − tn−1
v(tn)(1 + ε)
=
β ′′
1 + ε
> β ′. (11)
Put ξn := ||xn||1; the sequence ξn is strictly increasing (because (1 +
31Subscripts n,m, and j are used for sequences, whereas i is used exclusively for coor-
dinates; thus xn is a vector in R
k
+, and xi is the i-th coordinate of x.
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ε)v(tn) < v(tn+1)) and ξ1 > 0 (because v(t1) > 0). Let X be a random vari-
able with support {x1, ..., xN} and distribution P [X = xn] = ξ1/ξn−ξ1/ξn+1
for every 1 ≤ n ≤ N, where we put ξN+1 := ∞; thus P [X ∈ {xn, ..., xN}] =
ξ1/ξn for every
32 n ≥ 1.
To compute BRev(X), we need to consider only the bundle prices ξn for
1 ≤ n ≤ N (these are the possible values of ∑iXi = ||X||1), for which we
have
ξn · P [||X||1 ≥ ξn] = ξn · P [X ∈ {xn, ..., xN}] = ξn ·
ξ1
ξn
= ξ1,
and so
BRev(X) = ξ1. (12)
Finally, the revenue R(µ;X) that µ extracts from X is
R(µ;X) ≥
N∑
n=1
s(xn)P [X = xn] ≥
N∑
n=1
tn
(
ξ1
ξn
− ξ1
ξn+1
)
(13)
=
N∑
n=1
(tn − tn−1) ξ1
ξn
> ξ1β
′ = β ′ ·BRev(X)
(use ξN+1 =∞, (11), and (12)).
Remark 5.3 (a) In the proof of part (ii) above: for any m < N let µm
be obtained by restricting the menu of µ to the entries chosen by x1, ..., xm
in µ (with ties broken the same way as in µ for x1, ..., xm, and arbitrarily
otherwise).33 The computation of R(µm;X) is the same as in (13), but the
sum is now going up only to m instead of N, and thus there is a final term
32Since the payment s(xn) increases with n, we want to put as much probability as
possible on points xn with high n, subject to the constraint that the bundled revenue is
kept fixed, specifically, equal to ξ1 = ||x1||1; for illustration see the random valuation X
in Example 5.2(i) above.
33Formally, µm = (qm, sm) satisfies (qm(x), sm(x)) = (q(x), s(x)) for x ∈ {x1, ..., xm}
and (qm(x), sm(x)) ∈ argmax1≤n≤m(q(xn) · x− s(xn)) otherwise.
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of tm(ξ1/ξm+1) that needs to be subtracted; this gives
R(µm;X) >
(
m∑
n=1
tn − tn−1
ξn
− tm
ξm+1
)
·BRev(X) (14)
(recall (12)). This result will be used in Proposition 7.1 below.
(b) The random valuation X that we have constructed in part (ii) of the
proof has finite support, and is thus bounded from above; one may therefore
rescale it (which does not affect the ratio of revenues) so that it takes values
in, say, [0, 1]k.
(c) If the mechanism µ has a finite menu of size m then v(t) can take at
most m distinct values, and so N ≤ m and the support of the resulting X is
of size at most m.
(d) If the mechanism µ has a finite menu of size m then MoB(µ) ≤ m
(because v(t) ≥ t implies that each term in the sum (9) is ≤ 1). This is the
linear-in-menu-size bound of Proposition 3.1(iii); Example 3.2 in Section 3.3
above is obtained by making each term close to 1.
In Appendix A.2 we will provide a similar analysis with the separate
revenue instead of the bundling revenue; it will use the ∞-norm instead of
the 1-norm.
6 The Guaranteed Fraction of Optimal Rev-
enue (GFOR)
Based on the result of the previous section we can now construct mechanisms
whose revenues may be arbitrarily higher than the bundling revenue, which
yields the GFOR= 0 result.
Proposition 6.1 Let k = 2. For every finite m ≥ 1 there exists a two-good
mechanism µ with a menu of size m such that
MOB(µ) >
1
2
lnm− 1.
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Proof. Let m = (N + 1)2 − 1 where N ≥ 2 is an integer. Let g0, g1, ..., gm
be the m + 1 = (N + 1)2 points of the 1/N -grid of [0, 1]2 arranged in the
lexicographic order, i.e., in order of increasing first coordinate, and, for equal
first coordinate, in order of increasing second coordinate (thus g0 = (0, 0)
and gm = (1, 1)).
For each n ≥ 1, by writing the vector gn as gn = (i1/N, i2/N) with
i1 ≡ i(n)1 and i2 ≡ i(n)2 integers between 0 and N, we define yn := (N+1−i2, 1).
We claim that for every 0 ≤ j < n we have
(gn − gj) · yn ≥ 1
N
. (15)
Indeed, let gj = (ℓ1/N, ℓ2/N). Now j < n implies either (i) i1 = ℓ1 and
i2 ≥ ℓ2+1, in which case (gn−gj)·yn = i2/N−ℓ2/N ≥ 1/N , or (ii) i1 ≥ ℓ1+1,
in which case (gn−gj)·yn = (i1/N−ℓ1/N)(N+1−i2)+(i2/N−ℓ2/N) ≥ 1/N
because i1 − ℓ1 ≥ 1 and i2 − ℓ2 ≥ 0−N = −N.
Let tn := N
n−1 and xn := N
nyn, and consider the mechanism µ = (q, s)
with menu {(gn, tn)}mn=1 that is “seller-favorable”; i.e., when indifferent, the
buyer chooses the outcome with the highest payment (that is, ties are broken
in favor of the seller; see Hart and Reny 2015). For every 0 ≤ j < n we have
gn · xn − gj · xn = Nn(gn − gj) · yn ≥ Nn−1 = tn ≥ tn − tj ,
and so gn · xn − tn ≥ gj · xn − tj . Therefore a buyer of type xn will not
choose any menu entry (gj, tj) with j < n (by seller-favorability when there
is indifference, because tj < tn), and so s(xn) is one of {tn, tn+1, ..., tm}, which
implies that s(xn) ≥ tn. Thus v(tn) ≤ ||xn||1 = Nn(N + 2− i(n)2 ), and so
MoB(µ) =
m∑
n=1
tn − tn−1
v(tn)
≥
m∑
n=1
Nn−1 −Nn−2
Nn(N + 2− i(n)2 )
≥
N∑
i1=1
N∑
i2=1
1
N
1
N + 2− i2 =
N+1∑
ℓ=2
1
ℓ
> ln(N + 2)− 1 > 1
2
lnm− 1
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(in the second line we have dropped the terms with i1 = 0 or i2 = 0).
Thus MoB(menu size ≤ m) is at least of the order of logm; in the next
section we will improve this lower bound and show that it is polynomial in
m. From Proposition 6.1 we immediately get parts (i) and (ii) of Theorem
A.
Proof of Theorem A(i) and (ii). We prove this for k = 2 goods; for
k > 2 goods we take the two-good random valuation and append k−2 goods
with constant valuation 0, which does not affect any of the revenues.
(i) We have MoB(M; 2 goods) = supµMoB(µ) =∞ by Proposition 6.1,
and so GFOR(bundled; 2 goods) = 1/MoB(M; 2 goods) = 0 (see Lemma
3.4(ii) in Section 3.4).
(ii) For every finite m ≥ 1, let µ be the mechanism given by Proposition
6.1, and then let X be a random valuation in [0, 1]2 with support of size m,
as constructed by Theorem 5.1 (see Remark 5.3(b) and (c)), that satisfies
Rev(X)
BRev(X)
≥ R(µ;X)
BRev(X)
>
1
2
lnm− 1. (16)
An explicit random valuation X that satisfies (16) is easily obtained from
the proof of Proposition 6.1. Take xn = N
nyn = N
n(N +1− in2 , 1), put ξn :=
||xn||1, and let X have support {x1, ..., xm} and distribution P [X = xn] =
ξ1/ξn − ξ1/ξn+1 for every 1 ≤ n ≤ m. Then BRev(X) = ξ1 and Rev(X) ≥
R(µ;X) > ξ1((1/2) lnm − 1) (cf. the proof of Theorem 5.1). To get the
valuations in [0, 1]2 one just needs to rescale: divide everything by Nm.
Taking m large enough so that (1/2) lnm − 1 > 1/(3ε) then yields (use
Proposition 3.1(iv)) DRev(X) ≤ 3·BRev(X) < ε·Rev(X).
Remark 6.2 Any random valuation X ′ that is close to the above random
valuation X will yield a similar gap between the optimal revenue and the
simple revenues.34 The same applies to all our constructions, and so none of
our results is knife-edge or pathological.
34For formal revenue continuity results, see Hart and Reny (2017, Appendix A).
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7 A General Construction
We now generalize the construction of the previous section, and obtain a
mechanism µ with infinite MoB, together with a corresponding random val-
uation X for which the optimal revenue is infinite, whereas all its simple
revenues—bundled, separate, deterministic, finite-menu—are bounded; this
proves Theorem A(iii). Proposition 7.1 below will turn out to be useful also
for evaluating MoB of deterministic mechanisms, thereby proving Theorem
D.
Proposition 7.1 Let (gn)
N
n=0 be a finite or countably infinite sequence in
[0, 1]k starting with g0 = (0, ..., 0), and let (yn)
N
n=1 be a sequence of points in
R
k
+ such that
gapn := min
0≤j<n
(gn − gj) · yn > 0
for all n ≥ 1. Then for every ε > 0 there exist a sequence (tn)Nn=1 of positive
real numbers, a k-good mechanism µ with menu {(gn, tn)}Nn=1, and a k-good
random valuation X with 0 <BRev(X) <∞ such that
MoB(µ) ≥ (1− ε)
N∑
n=1
gapn
||yn||1 ,
Rev(X)
BRev(X)
≥ R(µ;X)
BRev(X)
≥ (1− ε)
N∑
n=1
gapn
||yn||1 , and (17)
Rev[m](X)
BRev(X)
≥ R(µm;X)
BRev(X)
≥ (1− ε)
m∑
n=1
gapn
||yn||1 − ε (18)
for every finite 1 ≤ m < N, where µm denotes the mechanism obtained by
restricting µ to its first m menu entries {(gn, tn)}mn=1.
Proof. Let xn := (tn/gapn)yn where the sequence of positive numbers
(tn)n≥1 increases fast enough so that the sequence ξn := ||xn||1 = tn||yn||1/gapn
is increasing and tn+1/tn ≥ 1/ε for all n ≥ 1. We have ξn ≥ tn (because
gapn ≤ gn · yn ≤ ||yn||1) and thus, when N is infinite, (tn)n and (ξn)n both
increase to infinity; when N is finite, we put tN+1 = ξN+1 = ∞. For every
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0 ≤ j < n,
gn · xn − gj · xn = tn
gapn
(gn − gj) · yn ≥ tn ≥ tn − tj
(for j = 0 put as usual t0 = 0). Thus, in the seller-favorable mechanism
µ = (q, s) with menu {(gn, tn)}Nn=1, the buyer of type xn prefers the menu
entry (gn, tn) to any entry (gj, tj) with 0 ≤ j < n. Therefore s(xn) ≥ tn, and
so v(tn) ≤ ||xn||1 = ξn, and we get
MoB(µ) =
N∑
n=1
tn − tn−1
v(tn)
≥
N∑
n=1
tn − tn−1
ξn
=
N∑
n=1
tn − tn−1
tn
gapn
||yn||1 ≥ (1− ε)
N∑
n=1
gapn
||yn||1 (19)
(the final inequality follows from tn−1/tn ≤ ε). As in the proof of Theorem
5.1, let X take the value xn with probability ξ1/ξn−ξ1/ξn+1, then R(µ;X) ≥
ξ1 ·
∑N
n=1(tn − tn−1)/ξn and BRev(X) ≤ ξ1, which implies (17) (use (19));
to get (18) for a finite m < N, use (14) and ξm+1 ≥ tm+1 ≥ tm/ε.
Remark 7.2 The random valuation X that we have constructed in Propo-
sition 7.1 is bounded away from zero: ||X||1 ≥ ||x1||1 = ξ1 > 0.
Before showing how to obtain the infinite separation of Theorem A(iii), we
use Proposition 7.1 for deterministic mechanisms, proving the lower bound
on MoB(deterministic) of Theorem D (recall that the upper bound of
2k − 1 is immediate; see Proposition 3.1(iv)).
Proposition 7.3 For every k ≥ 2,
MoB(deterministic; k goods) ≥
k∑
ℓ=1
1
ℓ
(
k
ℓ
)
>
2k − 1
k
. (20)
Proof. Let I0, I1, I2, ..., I2k−1 be the 2
k subsets of {1, . . . , k} ordered in
weakly increasing size (i.e., |In| ≥ |In−1| for all n), and let gn be the in-
dicator vector of In (i.e., the i-th coordinate of gn is 1 for i ∈ In and 0 for
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i 6∈ In). Take yn = gn (thus ||yn||1 = |In|); then for 0 ≤ j < n we have
gj · gn = |Ij ∩ In| < |In| = gn · gn (the strict inequality holds because oth-
erwise In would be a subset of Ij, contradicting |Ij| ≤ |In| and j 6= n), and
thus gapn ≥ 1 (in fact, gapn = 1: take Ij to be a subset of In with one less
element). Thus
2k−1∑
n=1
gapn
||yn||1 ≥
2k−1∑
n=1
1
|In| =
k∑
ℓ=1
1
ℓ
(
k
ℓ
)
,
and we use Proposition 7.1. Replacing each 1/ℓ with the lower 1/k yields
the final inequality.
Remark 7.4 Let dk denote the binomial sum in (20).
(a) A better lower bound on dk, easily obtained by replacing each 1/ℓ
with the lower 1/(ℓ+ 1), is35 dk ≥ (2k+1 − k − 2)/(k + 1) ∼ 2 · (2k − 1)/k.
(b) For large k most of the mass of the binomial coefficients, whose sum
is 2k − 1, is at those ℓ that are close to k/2, and so dk ∼ 1/(k/2) · (2k − 1) =
2 ·(2k−1)/k (formally, use a standard large deviation inequality; in (a) above
we got this estimate only as a lower bound on dk).
(c) For k = 2 goods we have d2 =
(
2
1
)
/1 +
(
2
2
)
/2 = 5/2, which turns out
to be the exact value of MoB; see Proposition A.1 in Appendix A.1 (proved
by using, again, Theorem 5.1).
(d) Proposition A.10 in Appendix A.2 shows that the same lower bound
of (2k − 1)/k also holds relative to the separate (instead of the bundling)
revenue, and even relative to the maximum of the two revenues.
We now construct, already for two goods, an infinite sequence of points
for which the appropriate sum of gaps in Proposition 7.1 is infinite.
Proposition 7.5 There exists an infinite sequence of points (gn)
∞
n=1 in [0, 1]
2
with ||gn||2 ≤ 1 such that taking yn = gn for all n we have gapn = Ω(n−6/7).
Proof. The sequence of points that we build is composed of a sequence of
“shells,” each containing multiple points. The shells get closer and closer
to each other, approaching the unit sphere as the shell, N , goes to infinity:
35The standard notation f(k) ∼ g(k) means that f(k)/g(k)→ 1 as k →∞.
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all the points gn in the N -th shell are of length ||gn||2 =
∑N
ℓ=1 ℓ
−3/2/α,
where α =
∑∞
ℓ=1 ℓ
−3/2 (which indeed converges; thus ||gn||2 approaches 1 as
n increases), and each shell N contains N3/4 different points in it so that the
angle between any two of them is at least Ω(N−3/4).
We now estimate gn ·gj = ||gn||2 · ||gj||2 · cos(θ), where θ denotes the angle
between gn and gj. Let N be gn’s shell. For j < n there are two possibilities:
either gj is in the same shell, N, as gn or it is in a smaller shell N
′ < N. In
the first case we have θ ≥ Ω(N−3/4) and thus cos(θ) ≤ 1−Ω(N−3/2) (because
cos(x) = 1−x2/2+x4/24−. . .) and since ||gn||2 = Θ(1) we have gn·gn−gn·gj ≥
Ω(N−3/2). In the second case, ||gn||2−||gj||2 =
∑N
ℓ=N ′+1 ℓ
−3/2/α ≥ N−3/2/α,
and so again since ||gn||2 = Θ(1) we have gn · gn − gn · gj ≥ Ω(N−3/2). Thus
for any point gn in the N -th shell we have gapn = Ω(N
−3/2). Since the first
N shells together contain
∑N
ℓ=1 ℓ
3/4 = Θ(N7/4) points, we have n = Θ(N7/4)
and thus gapn = Ω(N
−3/2) = Ω(n−6/7).
This directly implies Theorem A(iii), i.e., the infinite separation between
the optimal revenue and the deterministic revenue, and also the lower bound
in Theorem C, i.e., the revenue may increase polynomially in the menu size.
Proof of Theorems A(iii) and C. For k = 2 the infinite sequence of
points (gn)
∞
n=1 constructed in Proposition 7.5, together with yn = gn for all
n, satisfies
∑m
n=1 gapn/||gn||1 ≥
∑m
n=1 gapn/
√
2 ≥ Ω(∑mn=1 n−6/7) (recall that
||gn||2 ≤ 1 and so ||gn||1 ≤
√
2). When m =∞ this sum is infinite, and when
m is finite it is Ω(m1/7). Applying Proposition 7.1 gives a two-good random
valuation X that satisfies 0 <BRev(X) <∞ (and thus 0 <DRev(X) <∞
as well), Rev(X) = ∞, and Rev[m](X) = Ω(m1/7) for every finite m. For
k > 2, again, add k−2 goods with constant valuation 0. This proves the two
results (for Theorem A(iii) just rescale X to make DRev equal to 1; and the
upper bound in Theorem C is by Proposition 3.1).
8 Additive Menu Size
We start by proving Theorem E, which says that MoB of selling separately
k goods equals the number of goods k.
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Proof of Theorem E. For each good i we have Xi ≤
∑
ℓXℓ, which im-
plies that36 Rev(Xi) ≤Rev(
∑
ℓXℓ) =BRev(X). Summing over i yields
SRev(X) ≤ k·BRev(X).
Example 27 in Hart and Nisan (2017) shows that this bound is tight for
every k, even for independent goods.
Now optimal separate mechanisms sell each good i at a price pi, and so
have a menu size of at most 2k − 1 (the buyer can buy any set of goods
I ⊆ {1, . . . , k} for the price ∑i∈I pi), and yet Theorem E shows that the
separate revenue is at most k times the bundling revenue, rather than 2k− 1
times that (as is the case for menu size 2k − 1, and in particular for deter-
ministic mechanisms; see Theorem D). Intuitively, this seems related to the
fact that separate-selling mechanisms have only k “degrees of freedom” or
“parameters” (the k prices).37 To formalize this we introduce a more refined
“additive menu size” complexity measure, as follows.
Let µ be a k-good mechanism with menu M ⊆ [0, 1]k × R+. An additive
representation of M is a subset M0 = {(g1, t1), (g2, t2), ..., (gm, tm)} ⊆ M of
menu entries, which we will refer to as basic menu entries, such that every
menu entry (g, t) in M can be represented as a sum of basic menu entries in
M0, i.e., (g, t) =
∑
n∈N(gn, tn) for some N ⊆ M0, and moreover every partial
sum
∑
n∈N ′(gn, tn) with N
′ ⊂ N is also a menu entry in38 M. The additive
menu size of a mechanism µ is defined as the minimal size |M0| of an additive
representation of its menu M. Since taking M0 equal to M trivially yields an
additive representation, the additive menu size can thus only be lower than
its menu size. For separate selling of k goods, the additive menu size is at
most k, rather than 2k − 1: the basic menu entries consist of selling each
36Use the monotonicity of the one-good revenue (Hart and Reny 2015 or Hart and Nisan
2017), or Myerson’s (1981) characterization (4).
37This is related to the fact that menu size is defined using the “normal” form of a
mechanism—its menu—rather than its other, possibly simpler, descriptions.
38Our definition is just one of several possible definitions. Indeed, basic entries may
be combined in other ways—such as taking the allocation probabilites to be independent
(as in Briest et al. 2015), or adding them and then capping the sum at 1. What matters
(see the proof of Proposition 8.1 below) is that any chosen basic entry should yield a
nonnegative payoff (i.e., if (g, t) is part of the set chosen by type x then g · x− t ≥ 0); the
variants mentioned above satisfy this.
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good by itself at its price.39
The corresponding revenue is
• Rev[m]∗(X), the “additive-menu-size-m” revenue, is the maximal rev-
enue that can be obtained by mechanisms whose additive menu size is
at most m.
Interestingly, the basic properties of the menu size, namely, that menu
size 1 yields the bundling revenue, and that the increase in revenue is at most
linear in the menu size (Proposition 3.1 in Section 3.2), hold for the additive
menu size as well.
Proposition 8.1 For every k ≥ 2 and every k-good random valuation X,
(i) Rev[1]∗(X) =Rev[1](X) =BRev(X), and
(ii) Rev[m](X) ≤Rev[m]∗(X) ≤ m·BRev(X) for every m ≥ 1.
Proof. The only claim that is not immediate is the last inequality. Let
M0 with |M0| = m be a minimal additive representation of the menu. Let
(g, t) ∈M0 be a basic menu entry. If the buyer with valuation x chooses (g, t)
(i.e., (g, t) is part of the chosen subset N ⊆M0), then g ·x−t ≥ 0 (otherwise,
dropping it from the chosen subset—i.e., switching toN\{(g, t)},which yields
an available menu entry—would strictly increase the buyer’s payoff at x);
hence
∑
i xi ≥ g · x ≥ t (the first inequality is due to (1, ..., 1) ≥ g and
x ≥ 0). Therefore the total probability40 π that (g, t) is chosen is at most
P
[∑k
i=1Xi ≥ t
]
, and so that part of the expected revenue that comes from
(g, t), namely t · π, is at most t ·P
[∑k
i=1Xi ≥ t
]
≤BRev(X). This holds for
each one of the m basic menu entries in M0.
Proposition 8.1 thus implies that the results in this paper hold also for
this more refined complexity measure; specifically, in each one of Theorems
A–D one may replace menu size with menu size∗. Moreover, by Theorem
E, this measure captures well the complexity of selling the goods separately:
its additive menu size is at most k.
39More precisely, it is the number of goods whose price is positive.
40The sum of these probabilities over all basic menu entries may be as high as m, as
these events need not be disjoint (in contrast to standard menu items, where they are
disjoint).
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9 Bounded Valuations
In this section we deal with valuations in bounded domains, i.e., [L,H ]k
for 0 < L < H < ∞. Since rescaling valuations by a constant factor of
1/L changes the range from [L,H ]k to [1, H/L]k without affecting ratios of
revenues, we take without loss of generality L = 1 and the range [1, H ]k. We
first prove Theorem B: for two goods with valuations in [1, H ]2, mechanisms
need not have more than a polylogarithmic-in-H menu size in order to obtain
arbitrarily good approximations. It is a direct corollary of the following
lemma that shows how to incur, with an appropriate bounded menu size,
only a small loss of payment for every valuation x.
Lemma 9.1 Let k = 2. For every H > 1 and ε > 0 there exists m =
O(ε−5 log2H) such that for every two-good mechanism µ = (q, s) whose
nonzero payments lie in the range [1, H ] (i.e., for each x either s(x) = 0
or s(x) ∈ [1, H ]) there exists a mechanism µ˜ = (q˜, s˜) with menu size at most
m that satisfies s˜(x) ≥ (1− ε)s(x) for all x.
Proof. We will discretize the menu of the given mechanism µ. Our first
step will be to discretize the payments s, and the second to discretize the
allocations q = (q1, q2).
We start by splitting the range [1, H ] into K subranges, each with a ratio
of at most H1/K between its endpoints, where K is chosen so that H1/K ≤
ε2, i.e., K = O(ε−2 logH). We define a real function φ(s) by rounding s
up to the top of its range and then multiplying by 1 − ε. Hence we have
(1 − ε)s < φ(s) < (1 − ε)(1 + ε2)s. Then for any s′ < s(1 − ε) we have
φ(s)− φ(s′) < (1− ε)(1 + ε2)s− (1− ε)s′ < s− s′.
Now we take every menu entry (q, s) of the original mechanism and re-
place s with φ(s). The previous property of φ ensures that any buyer who
previously preferred (q, s) to some other menu entry (q′, s′) with s′ < (1−ε)s
still prefers (q, φ(s)) in the new menu; thus in the new menu he pays φ(s′)
for some s′ ≥ (1 − ε)s, and φ(s′) > (1 − ε)s′ ≥ (1 − ε)2s; his payment in
the new menu is therefore at least (1− ε)2 times his payment in the original
menu.
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We now have a menu with only K distinct price levels s1 < · · · < sK .
Before we continue, we scale it down by a factor of (1−ε), i.e., multiply both
the q’s and the s’s by (1− ε). This does not change the menu choice of any
buyer, reduces the payments by a factor of exactly 1 − ε, and ensures that
q1, q2 ≤ 1−ε. We now round down each q1 and each q2 to an integer multiple
of ε/K, and then add εj/K to each menu entry whose price is sj . Notice
that rounding down reduces each q by at most ε/K, and since higher-paying
menu entries got a boost that is at least ε/K greater than any lower-paying
menu entry, any buyer that previously chose an entry that pays s can now
choose only an entry that pays some s′ ≥ s.
All in all, we have obtained a new mechanism whose payment is at least
(1 − ε)3 ≥ 1− 3ε times that of the original one (and so we redefine the ε in
the proof to be 1/3 of the ε in the statement). There are K = O(ε−2 logH)
price levels and ε−1K = O(ε−3 logH) different allocation levels for both q1
and q2. However, notice that for a fixed price level s and a fixed q1 there
can only be a single value of q2 that is actually used in the menu (as lower
ones will be dominated), and so the total number of possible allocations is
O(ε−5 log2H).
Proof of Theorem B. Let X be a two-good random valuation with values
in [1, H ]2, and let µ = (q, s) be a two-good mechanism. We have s(x) ≤
q(x) · x ≤ 2H for every x ∈ [1, H ]2; and, because the revenue from X is
at least 2 (obtained, for instance, by selling each good at price 1), we can
assume without loss of generality that R(µ;X) ≥ 2. First, we eliminate from
the menu of µ all entries whose payment is less than41 2ε; any type x with
s(x) < 2ε then either pays 0, or some s(y) ≥ 2ε. The loss in revenue, if any,
is thus at most 2ε · P [s(X) < 2ε] ≤ 2ε. Let µ′ = (q′, s′) denote the resulting
mechanism; then the range of its nonzero payments is [2ε, 2H ]. Applying
Lemma 9.1 to µ′ yields a new mechanism µ˜ = (q˜, s˜) with a menu of size
41Formally, for every x with s(x) < 2ε we take (q′(x), s′(x)) to be a maximizer of
q(y) · x− s(y) over all y such that either s(y) = 0 or s(y) ≥ 2ε.
39
O(ε−5 log2(H/ε)), such that s˜(x) ≥ (1− ε)s(x) for all x, and thus
R(µ˜;X) ≥ (1− ε)R(µ′;X) ≥ (1− ε)(R(µ;X)− 2ε)
≥ (1− 2ε)R(µ;X)
(recall that R(µ;X) ≥ 2).
Notice that the polylogarithmic dependence of m on H is “about right”
since the valuation X induced by the first m points in the construction of
Proposition 7.5 (used for proving Theorem A(ii)) has H = mO(m), and the
Ω(m1/7) gap between Rev(X) and Rev[1](X) implies that for, say, m =
O((logH)1/8), we get Rev[m](X) = o(Rev(X)).
For more than two goods, i.e., k > 2, we obtain the somewhat weaker
result that the menu size need only be polynomial in H .
Proposition 9.2 For every k ≥ 2 and ε > 0 there is m0 = (k/ε)O(k) such
that for every k-good random valuation X with values in [0, 1]k and every
m ≥ m0,
Rev[m](X) ≥ Rev(X)− ε.
This result is directly implied by the following lemma.
Lemma 9.3 Let m = (n + 1)k − 1, where n ≥ 1 is an integer. Then for
every k-good random valuation X with values in [0, 1]k,
Rev[m](X) ≥ Rev(X)− 2k√
n
.
Proof. Let X have values in [0, 1]k, and let µ = (q, s) be a mechanism.
Define a new mechanism µ˜ = (q˜, s˜) as follows: for each x ∈ [0, 1]n, let
q˜(x) be the rounding up of q(x) to the 1/n-grid on [0, 1]k, and let s˜(x) :=
(1− 1/√n)s(x). Since q˜ can take at most (n+1)k different values, the menu
size of µ˜ is at most (n+ 1)k − 1 = m.
If q˜(x) · x − s˜(x) ≤ q˜(y) · x − s˜(y), then (recall that q(x) · x − s(x) ≥
q(y) · x − s(y)) we must have (1/n)∑ki=1 xi ≥ (1/√n)(s(x) − s(y)); hence
s(y) ≥ s(x)−k/√n (since∑i xi ≤ k), which implies that the seller’s revenue
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at x from µ˜ must be ≥ (1 − 1/√n)(s(x) − k/√n). Therefore R(µ˜;X) ≥
(1−1/√n)R(µ;X)−k/√n ≥ R(µ;X)−2k/√n (since R(µ;X) ≤∑i xi ≤ k).
From Proposition 9.2 we can derive an essentially equivalent multiplica-
tive approximation result.
Proposition 9.4 For every k ≥ 2, ε > 0, and H > 1, there is m0 =
(H/ε)O(k) such that for every k-good random valuation X with values in
[1, H ]k and every m ≥ m0,
Rev[m](X) ≥ (1− ε) ·Rev(X).
Proof. We first rescale [1, H ] to [1/H, 1], which for multiplicative approx-
imations is the same. We then design a mechanism that gives an additive
approximation to within εk/H , which, by Proposition 9.2, requires a menu
size m as stated. Now, since each Xi is bounded from below by 1/H , the
revenue of X is at least k/H (each good is sold for sure at the price 1/H),
and thus an εk/H-additive approximation is also a (1 − ε)-multiplicative
approximation, as required.
A Appendix
A.1 Two-Good Deterministic Mechanisms
Using the formula of Theorem 5.1 we can show that the Multiple of Basic
revenue for two-good deterministic mechanisms equals precisely the d2 = 5/2
bound of Proposition 7.3 (see Remark 7.4(c)).
Proposition A.1 For k = 2 goods,
MoB(deterministic; 2 goods) =
5
2
.
Proof. We compute the supremum of MoB(µ), as given by Theorem 5.1,
over all deterministic mechanisms µ. Such a mechanism is given by nonneg-
ative prices p1, p2, and p12 for good 1, good 2, and the bundle, respectively
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(thus b(x) = max{0, x1 − p1, x2 − p2, x1 + x2 − p12}). Without loss of gen-
erality we assume that p1 ≤ p2 ≤ p12; the first inequality because we can
interchange the two coordinates, and the second because if pi > p12 then the
menu entry xi − pi is never chosen, and so replacing pi with p′i := p12 does
not affect the revenue. We have four cases:
• If p1 > 0 then MoB(µ) = (p1 − 0)/v(p1) + (p2 − p1)/v(p2) + (p12 −
p2)/v(p12). Now v(p1) = p1 (attained at x = (p1, 0)) and v(p2) = p2
(attained at x = (0, p2)); as for v(p12), if s(x) = p12 then x1+x2−p12 ≥
xi − pi for i = 1, 2, which implies x3−i ≥ p12 − pi ≥ p12 − p2, and so
x1 + x2 ≥ 2(p12 − p2). Therefore MoB(µ) ≤ 1 + 1 + 1/2 = 5/2.
• If p1 = 0 < p2 then MoB(µ) = (p2 − 0)/v(p2) + (p12 − p2)/v(p12) ≤
1 + 1/2 = 3/2.
• If p1 = p2 = 0 < p12 then MoB(µ) ≤ 1.
• If p1 = p2 = p12 = 0 then MoB(µ) = 0.
Thus MoB(µ) ≤ 5/2 in all cases; taking, say, p1 = 1, p2 = H , and p12 =
H2 for large42 H shows that supµMoB(µ) over all deterministic mechanisms
µ is indeed 5/2.
For separate-selling mechanisms we have in addition p12 = p1 + p2, and
then v(p1 + p2) = p1 + p2 (attained at x = (p1, p2)), and so MoB(µ) =
1+1−p1/p2+ p1/(p1+ p2), which is less than 2, but can be made arbitrarily
close to 2 by taking, say, p1 = 1 and p2 = H for large H. This shows that
MoB(separate; 2 goods) = 2; cf. Theorem E. For symmetric deterministic
mechanisms we have p1 = p2, and so MoB(µ) ≤ p1/p1 + (p12 − p1)/(2(p12 −
p2)) = 3/2, with equality for, say, p1 = p2 = 1 and p12 = 2 (which is
in fact a symmetric separate-selling mechanism). Thus MoB(symmetric
deterministic; 2 goods) = MoB(symmetric separate; 2 goods) = 3/2.
42Alternatively, use the bound of Proposition 7.3 (see Remark 7.4(b)).
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A.2 The Multiple of Separate Revenue (MoS)
Our MoB measure takes as basic revenue the bundling revenue, obtained by
menu-size-1. We now consider using the separate revenue instead:
MoS(N ;X) := sup
x∈X
N -Rev(X)
SRev(X)
(MoS stands for “Multiple of Separate revenue”).
We start with a simple comparison between the bundling and separate
revenues.
Proposition A.2 For every k ≥ 2,
MoS(bundled; k goods) ≤ k.
Proof. Let BRev(X) be achieved for a bundle price of p. If the separate
auction offers each good at a price of p/k then whenever
∑
i xi ≥ p we have
xi ≥ p/k for some i, and so one of the k goods will be acquired in the separate
auction; thus BRev(X) ≤ k·SRev(X).
This is tight for k = 2.
Example A.3 Let X1 be distributed uniformly on [0, 1], and consider the
two-good random valuation X = (X1, 1 − X1). The bundling revenue is 1,
since the bundle is always worth 1 to the buyer. Each good is distributed
uniformly on [0, 1] and so the optimal revenue from each good is, by (4), 1/4
(obtained at price 1/2).
For larger values of k, we can get a stronger result.
Proposition A.4 There exists a constant c <∞ such that for every k ≥ 2
and every k-good random valuation X,
MoS(bundled; k goods) ≤ c log k.
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Proof. Let BRev(X) be achieved for bundle price p. We first assume
without loss of generality that the support of X contains only points x with∑
i xi = p or
∑
i xi = 0. (This is without loss of generality, since the random
variable X ′ defined by X ′ := 0 when
∑
iXi < p and X := (p/
∑
iXi)X sat-
isfies BRev(X ′) =BRev(X), while SRev(X ′) ≤SRev(X) because X ′ ≤ X
everywhere.43) We now make another assumption without loss of generality,
namely, that
∑
iXi = p (and so BRev(X) = p). (This is without loss of
generality because if we replace X with its conditional on
∑
i xi = p, then
all revenues are just rescaled by a factor of 1/P [
∑
iXi = p].)
At this point there are two different ways to proceed; we present both, as
they may lead to different extensions.
Proof 1: Let ei := E[Xi] be the expected value of good i; then (using our
assumptions)
∑
i ei = p. The claim is that good i can be sold in a separate
auction yielding a revenue of at least (ei−p/(2k))/(2(1+log2 k)). The result
is then implied by summing over all i.
Indeed, split the range of values of Xi into (2+log2 k) subranges: a “low”
subrange for which Xi ≤ p/(2k), and, for each j = 0, . . . , log2 k, a subrange
where p/(2j+1) < Xi ≤ p/(2j) (notice that since Xi ≤ p we have covered the
whole support of Xi). The low subrange contributes at most p/(2k) to the
expectation of Xi, and thus one of the other 1+ log2 k subranges contributes
at least ((ei − p/(2k))/(1 + log2 k) to this expectation. The lower bound of
this subrange, p/(2j+1), is smaller by a factor of at most 2 than any value in
the subrange, and so setting it as the price for good i yields a revenue that
is at least half of the contribution of this subrange to the expectation, i.e.,
at least ((ei − p/(2k))/(2(1 + log2 k)).
Proof 2: Let ri :=Rev(Xi) = supt>0 t · (1− Fi(t)) (where Fi denotes the
cumulative distribution function of Xi); then 1 − Fi(t) ≤ ri/t and so (recall
that Xi ≤ p because
∑
iXi = p)
E [Xi] =
∫ ∞
0
(1− Fi(t))dt ≤
∫ ri
0
1dt +
∫ p
ri
ri
t
dt = ri(1 + ln p− ln ri).
Averaging over i and using the concavity in r of the function r(1+ln p− ln r)
43See footnote 36 above.
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yields
p
k
=
1
k
k∑
i=1
E [Xi] ≤ s
k
(
1 + ln p− ln s
k
)
,
where s :=
∑
i ri. Thus p/s ≤ 1+ ln(p/s)+ ln k, from which it follows that44
BRev(X)/SRev(X) = p/s < 4 ln k.
Corollary A.5 There exists a constant c <∞ such that for every k ≥ 2,
MoS(deterministic; k goods) ≤ c2k log k.
For the special case of k = 2 goods, we have a somewhat tighter bound.
Proposition A.6 Let k = 2. Then
MoS(deterministic; 2 goods) ≤ 3.
Proof. A deterministic mechanism has at most three menu entries: either
selling just one of the goods, or selling the bundle. The portion of the revenue
that comes from those types that buy only good i cannot exceed Rev(Xi),
and the portion that comes from those that buy the bundle cannot exceed
BRev(X); in total, DRev(X) ≤SRev(X)+BRev(X). The proof is com-
pleted using Proposition A.2.
We now study MoS; the analysis is analogous to the one carried out
with respect to the bundling revenue in Sections 5–7, but we now use the
maximum norm ||x||∞ = maxi |xi| instead of the 1-norm.
We have
Theorem A.7 Let µ = (q, s) be a k-good mechanism. Then
1
k
∫ ∞
0
1
w(t)
dt ≤MoS(µ) ≤
∫ ∞
0
1
w(t)
dt,
44The function x− lnx−1− lnk is increasing in x, and is positive at x = 4 ln k (because
k ≥ 2 implies k3/ lnk > 4e).
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where for every t > 0 we define
w(t) := inf{||x||∞ : x ∈ Rk+ and s(x) ≥ t}.
Unlike Theorem 5.1, here we do not get a sharp formula for MoS, but
only an integral that is within a factor of k from it (see Remark A.8(b)
below).
Proof. Let γ :=
∫∞
0
1/w(t) dt.
First, for every t > 0 we have
P [s(X) ≥ t] ≤ P [||X||∞ ≥ w(t)] = P [∪i{Xi ≥ w(t)}] ≤
∑
i
P [Xi ≥ w(t)]
≤
∑
i
Rev(Xi)
w(t)
=
SRev(X)
w(t)
.
Integrating over t yields R(µ,X) ≤ γ·SRev(X), proving that MoS(µ) ≤ γ.
Second, we show that for every γ′ < γ there exists a k-good random
valuation X such that 0 <SRev(X) < ∞ and R(µ;X)/SRev(X) > γ′/k.
Let 0 = t0 < t1 < ... < tN < tN+1 = ∞ with 0 = w(t0) < w(t1) < w(t2) <
... < w(tN) < w(tN+1) =∞ be such that
γ′′ :=
N∑
n=1
tn − tn−1
w(tn)
> γ′.
Let ε > 0 be small enough so that γ′′ > (1+ ε)γ′ and w(tn+1) > (1+ ε)w(tn)
for all 1 ≤ n ≤ N, and choose for each 1 ≤ n ≤ N a point xn ∈ Rk+ such that
s(xn) ≥ tn and w(tn) ≤ ||xn||∞ < (1 + ε)w(tn); then
N∑
n=1
tn − tn−1
||xn||1 >
N∑
n=1
tn − tn−1
w(tn)(1 + ε)
=
γ′′
1 + ε
> γ′. (21)
Let X be a random variable with support {x1, ..., xN} and distribution
P [X = xn] = ξ1/ξn − ξ1/ξn+1 for every 1 ≤ n ≤ N, where ξn := ||xn||∞ and
we put ξN+1 :=∞; thus P [X ∈ {xn, ..., xN}] = ξ1/ξn for every n ≥ 1.
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Consider good i. For every u ∈ (ξn−1, ξn] (with 1 ≤ n ≤ N) we have
u · P [Xi ≥ u] ≤ u · P [X ∈ {xn, ..., xN}] = uξ1
ξn
≤ ξ1
(because X = xj for some j ≤ n − 1 implies Xi ≤ ||xj ||∞ ≤ ||xn−1||∞ =
ξn−1 < u). Therefore Rev(Xi) = supu>0 u · P [Xi ≥ u] ≤ ξ1 for every good i,
and so SRev(X) ≤ kξ1 (which is finite; also SRev(X) > 0 because X does
not vanish).
Finally, the revenue of R(µ;X) that µ gets from X is
R(µ;X) ≥
N∑
n=1
s(xn)P [X = xn] ≥
N∑
n=1
tn
(
ξ1
ξn
− ξ1
ξn+1
)
= ξ1
N∑
n=1
tn − tn−1
ξn
> ξ1γ
′ =
γ′
k
· kξ1 ≥
γ′
k
· SRev(X)
(recall (21)).
Remark A.8 (a) As in Theorem 5.1 (see Remark 5.3 following its proof),
the random valuation X in the second part of the proof may be taken so that
its values are in [0, 1]k and its support is at most the size of the menu of µ.
(b) The gap of k in Theorem A.7 is correct. Take two goods. For µ
that sells the bundle at the price of 1 we have w(1) = 1/2 (attained at
x = (1/2, 1/2)) and so γ(µ) = 2; the two-good random valuation X of
Example A.3 has R(µ;X)/SRev(X) = 1/(1/2) = γ(µ). For µ that sells each
good separately for the price of 1/2 we have w(1/2) = 1/2 and w(1) = 1,
and so45 γ(µ) = 2, but R(µ;X)/SRev(X) ≤ 1 = γ(µ)/k for any X (with
equality for, say, the constant valuation (1/2, 1/2)).
(c) Recalling the definition of v(t) in Theorem 5.1, we have 1/v(t) ≤
1/w(t) ≤ k/v(t) for every t (because ||x||1 ≥ ||x||∞ ≥ ||x||1/k), and so for
every mechanism µ we have MoB(µ) ≤ ∫ 1/w(t) dt ≤ k ·MoB(µ).
(d) We can take as benchmark the maximum of the two one-dimensional
45It is easy to see that γ(µ) = k for every k-good mechanism µ that sells the goods
separately at positive prices.
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mechanisms, bundled and separate (cf. Babaioff et al. 2014). Thus, putting
MoBS(µ) := sup
X
R(µ;X)
max{BRev(X),SRev(X)} ,
we have
1
k
∫ ∞
0
1
w(t)
dt ≤MoBS(µ) ≤
∫ ∞
0
1
v(t)
dt. (22)
Indeed, in the second part of the proof of Theorem A.7 above, for every
u ∈ (kξn−1, kξn],
u · P
[
k∑
i=1
Xi ≥ u
]
≤ u · P [X ∈ {xn, ..., xN}] = uξ1
ξn
≤ kξ1
(because X = xj for some j ≤ n−1 implies
∑
iXi ≤ k||xj ||∞ ≤ k||xn−1||∞ =
kξn−1 < u), and so BRev(X) = supu>0 u · P [Xi ≥ u] ≤ kξ1 as well, which
yields the first inequality in (22). For the second inequality we use
MoBS(µ) ≤MoB(µ) ≤ ∫ 1/v (which, by (c) above, yields a better inequality
than MoBS(µ) ≤MoS(µ) ≤ ∫ 1/w).
The analogous result to the construction of Section 7 is
Proposition A.9 Let (gn)
N
n=0 be a finite or countably infinite sequence in
[0, 1]k starting with g0 = (0, ..., 0), and let (yn)
N
n=1 be a sequence of vectors in
R
k
+ such that
gapn := min
0≤j<n
(gn − gj) · yn > 0
for all n ≥ 1. Then for every ε > 0 there exist a sequence (tn)Nn=1 of positive
real numbers, a k-good mechanism µ with menu {(gn, tn)}Nn=1, and a k-good
random valuation X with 0 <BRev(X) <∞, such that
MoS(X) ≥MoBS(X) > (1− ε) 1
k
N∑
n=1
gapn
||yn||∞ .
The proof is omitted, as it is identical to that of Proposition 7.1, except
that it uses throughout the∞-norm instead of the 1-norm (and the construc-
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tion of the appropriate random valuation is as in Theorem A.7 and Remark
A.8(d) above instead of Theorem 5.1).
As a consequence, for deterministic mechanisms we get (see Corollary A.5
for the opposite inequality):
Proposition A.10 For every k ≥ 2,
MoS(deterministic; k goods) ≥MoSB(deterministic; k goods) ≥ 2
k − 1
k
.
Proof. We proceed exactly as in the proof of Proposition 7.3, but now we
have ||yn||∞ = 1, and so we get
1
k
2k−1∑
n=1
gapn
||yn||∞ =
1
k
k∑
ℓ=1
(
k
ℓ
)
=
2k − 1
k
.
For k = 2 goods, the supremum of
∫
1/w over all deterministic mech-
anisms equals 3 (attained in the limit as H → ∞ by prices p1 = 1, p2 =
H, p12 = H
2; cf. the proof of Proposition A.1). Thus,
3
2
≤ MoS(deterministic; 2 goods) ≤ 3
3
2
≤ MoSB(deterministic; 2 goods) ≤ 5
2
(cf. Proposition A.1, which shows that MoB is exactly 5/2).
A.3 The Unit-Demand Model
In this section we briefly compare our model to the unit-demand model that
is considered in many papers. There are k goods for sale and a single buyer.
There are two basic differences between our model and the unit-demand
one. First, in the unit-demand model, the buyers are modeled as having
unit-demand valuations. Additionally, the unit-demand model requires the
mechanism to offer only single goods, rather than bundles of goods as in our
model. This second restriction does not turn out to matter.
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More formally, in the unit demand model there is a single buyer with a
unit demand valuation; i.e., the valuation of a set I ⊆ {1, . . . , k} of goods is
maxi∈I xi (rather than
∑
i∈I xi). A deterministic mechanism in this setting
would offer a price pi for each good i. For unit-demand buyers this is equiv-
alent to a completely general deterministic mechanism as there is no need to
offer prices for bundles since the buyer is not interested in them. Thus, for
example, a mechanism asking price p1 for good 1, price p2 for good 2, and
price p12 for both goods would be the same as asking price min{p1, p12} for
good 1 and price min{p1, p12} for good 2.
A randomized mechanism in this model is allowed to offer a set of lotteries,
each with its own price, where a lottery is a vector of probabilities α1, . . . , αk
of getting the goods, with
∑
i αi ≤ 1 (in contrast to our additive buyer,
where qi ≤ 1 for each i). Again, for unit-demand buyers this is equivalent
to general randomized mechanisms that are also allowed to offer lotteries
for bundles of goods. For example, a menu entry offering the lottery “good
1 with probability 2/9; good 2 with probability 3/9; and both goods with
probability 4/9” at a certain price can be replaced by the two menu entries
“good 1 with probability 6/9; good 2 with probability 3/9” and “good 1 with
probability 2/9; good 2 with probability 7/9,” each at the same price as in
the original menu entry.
Let us use the notation RevUD(X) to denote the revenue obtainable
from a unit-demand buyer with a k-good random valuation X . Similarly
DRevUD(X) denotes the revenue achievable by deterministic mechanisms.
We can compare these revenues to those achievable in our model from an
additive buyer whose valuation for the k goods is given by the same X .
Proposition A.11 For every k ≥ 2 and every k-good random valuation X,
(i) RevUD(X) ≤Rev(X) ≤ k·RevUD(X), and
(ii) DRevUD(X) ≤DRev(X) ≤ k2k·DRevUD(X).
Proof. The lower bounds in both cases are obtained by noting that any
mechanism in the unit-demand model offers only unit-demand menu entries,
and for these both the unit-demand buyer and the additive buyer have the
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same preferences; thus offering the same menu in our setting gives exactly
the same revenue as it does in the unit-demand setting.
For the upper bound for randomized mechanisms in (i), notice that if we
replace each menu entry ((g1, ..., gk); t) in our model (where 0 ≤ gi ≤ 1 for
each i) by the menu entry ((g1/k, . . . , gk/k); t/k), then we do not change the
preferences of the buyer between the different menu entries, and thus the
revenue drops by a factor of exactly k. However, the new mechanism gives
only unit-demand allocations (because g1/k + ... + gk/k ≤ 1), and for these
the unit-demand buyer and the additive buyer behave the same.
For the upper bound for deterministic mechanisms in (ii), consider a
deterministic mechanism in our model. Since it has at most 2k − 1 menu
entries, a fraction of at least 2−k of the revenue must come from one of them,
which allocates, say, a set I of goods. A mechanism that offers to sell only
this set I of goods at the same price t as the original mechanism did will
thus make at least a 2−k fraction of the revenue of the original one. Now
consider the unit-demand mechanism that offers each one of the goods in I
at the price t/|I|; whenever the additive buyer in the additive mechanism
buys I we are guaranteed that his value for at least one of the goods in I
is at least t/|I|, in which case the unit-demand buyer will also acquire that
good at t/|I| in the unit-demand mechanism.
The interesting gap in the above proposition is the exponential one for de-
terministic mechanisms in (ii), and indeed we can show that this is essentially
tight.
Proposition A.12 For every k ≥ 2,
sup
X
DRev(X)
DRevUD(X)
≥ 2
k − 1
k
.
Proof. For every X we have DRevUD(X) ≤SRev(X) because the good
prices used in any deterministic mechanism in the unit-demand model can
only yield more revenue in our additive model where the buyer may buy more
than a single good. Use Proposition A.10 in Appendix A.2.
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Despite the exponential separation, for fixed k it is constant, and so
a super-constant separation between randomized and deterministic mecha-
nisms in our setting is equivalent to the same separation in the unit-demand
setting.
A.4 More Than One Buyer
This paper has concentrated on a single-buyer scenario that may also be
interpreted to be a monopolistic price setting. One may naturally ask the
same questions in more general settings involving multiple buyers. An imme-
diate observation is that since our main results (Theorems A, C, and D) are
separations, they apply directly also to multiple-buyer settings, simply by
considering a single “significant” buyer together with multiple “negligible”
(in the extreme, with 0-value for all goods) buyers. The issue of extending
the results to multiple-buyer settings is thus relevant to the upper bounds
in the paper, both the significant ones (Propositions 9.2 and A.4) and the
simple ones (Proposition 3.1). In this appendix we discuss why these can all
be extended to the multiple-buyer scenario, at least if we are willing to incur
a loss that is linear in the number of buyers. It is not completely clear where
and how this loss may be avoided.
In the case of multiple buyers, we must first choose our notion of imple-
mentation: dominant strategy or Bayesian Nash. Also, we need to specify
whether we assume independence between buyers’ valuations or allow them
to be correlated. The discussion here will be coarse enough to apply to all
these variants at the same time, with differences noted explicitly.
The next issue is how should we define the menu size in the case of
multiple buyers. In the single-buyer case we defined it as the number of
options from which the buyer may choose, which is the same as the number
of allocations |{q(x) : x ∈ Rk+}\{(0, . . . , 0)}|. In the case of multiple buyers,
these are two separate notions. For example, consider deterministic auctions
of k goods among n buyers. There are a total of (n+1)k different allocations
(each good may go to any buyer or to no one), but each buyer considers
only 2k possibilities (whether he gets each good or not). Moreover, the set
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of allocations cannot be interpreted as a menu from which the buyers may
choose, since each buyer can choose only from the possibilities offered to
him (and these choices need not be feasible overall). It takes the combined
actions of all the buyers together in order for the mechanism outcome to be
determined. For this reason we prefer to define the menu size of a multiple-
buyer mechanism by considering its menu size from the point of view of the
different buyers. Since the menu that a buyer sees is a function of the bids
of the others, we take the maximum. We thus define:
• An n-buyer mechanism has a menu size of at most m if for every buyer
j = 1, . . . , n and every (n−1)-tuple of (direct) bids of the other buyers46
x−j ∈ (Rk+)n−1, the number of nonzero choices that buyer j faces is at
most m, i.e., |{qj(xj , x−j) : xj ∈ Rk+}\{(0, . . . , 0)}| ≤ m.
Note that if the original mechanism was incentive compatible in dominant
strategies then the mechanism induced on player j by x−j is also incentive
compatible. However, if the original mechanism was incentive compatible in
the Bayesian Nash sense then this need not be the case, but we still have
individual rationality47 of the induced mechanism, which suffices for what
comes next.
Let us first analyze the simplest mechanisms, those with a single non-
trivial menu entry for each buyer. Clearly, bundling mechanisms satisfy this
property; however, not every mechanism that has a single non-trivial menu
entry for each buyer can be converted to a bundling mechanism. We also
need to be careful with the meaning of a bundling mechanism. Clearly, in the
case of correlated buyer valuations, the optimal mechanism for selling even
a single good (the whole bundle in our case) is not necessarily to sell it to
the highest bidder, but rather to use the bids of the others to set the reserve
price for each bidder. (Consider, for example, the case of two buyers with a
common value, where the bid of one of them should be used as the asking
price for the other.) Thus, in the rest of the discussion below we use BRev
46Superscripts are used here for the buyers.
47This assumes that the original mechanism was ex-post individually rational, which
one may verify is without loss of generality relative to ex-ante individual rationality.
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to denote the optimal revenue from mechanisms that sell the bundle only as
a whole—not necessarily to the highest bidder or at a uniform reserve price.
For the case of independent buyer values, the simpler version that sells it to
the highest bidder at a fixed reserve price will suffice as well.
What can be easily observed is that by focusing solely on the buyer that
pays the largest fraction of the revenue, we can reduce the problem to the
single-buyer case and extract at least a 1/n fraction of revenue by selling the
bundle to that single buyer. A full bundling mechanism can only do better,
which gives us the analog to Proposition 3.1(i) for the case of n buyers:48
BRevn(X) ≤ Revn[1](X) ≤ n ·BRevn(X).
The loss of the factor of n can be seen to be justified by considering inde-
pendent buyer values and the restricted definition of bundling mechanisms
already in the case of one good (i.e., k = 1): take the distribution where each
buyer j = 1, ..., n values the single good at Hj with probability H−j, and
zero otherwise (independently over buyers), for a large enough but fixed H .
A similar argument that focuses on the single buyer that provides the
largest fraction of revenue yields the generalization of Proposition 3.1(iii)
and (iv):
Revn[m](X) ≤ n ·m ·BRevn(X) and
DRevn(X) ≤ n · (2k − 1) ·BRevn(X).
It turns out that the linear loss in n is required here too, again for indepen-
dent buyer values and the restricted interpretation of bundling mechanisms:
take the construction of Theorem D for each of the n different buyers and
combine it with the argument above. That is, whenever the construction
has a valuation x with probability p, let buyer j have valuation Hjx with
probability H−jp (independently over the buyers).
Versions of Propositions 9.2 and A.4 that incur a linear loss in n are also
easily implied, but do not seem to be interesting. It would seem that in
48The superscript n on the various revenues denotes the number of buyers.
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both cases sharper results, in which the additional loss due to the number of
buyers is avoided, might be obtained.
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